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A STUDY OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PRE-INITIAL  
ENTRY TRAINING PROGRAM OF THE  
PENNSYLVANIA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

BY

COLONEL GEORGE W. SCHULER, IN

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
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**A STUDY OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PRE-INITIAL ENTRY  
TRAINING PROGRAM OF THE PENNSYLVANIA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD**

**AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT**

by

**Colonel George W. Schuler, IN**

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**U.S. Army War College  
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## ABSTRACT

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT . . . . .	11
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
Background . . . . .	2
Limitations . . . . .	2
II. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE . . . . .	4
Performance . . . . .	4
Non-Prior Service Training . . . . .	6
Observations . . . . .	8
III. PENNSYLVANIA PRE-INITIAL ENTRY TRAINING PROGRAM . . . . .	10
Purpose and Objectives . . . . .	10
Process . . . . .	11
Staffing . . . . .	14
Program Instruction . . . . .	15
IV. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA . . . . .	20
Attrition . . . . .	20
BCT/AIT Attrition . . . . .	22
EPTS Attrition . . . . .	23
ELS Attrition . . . . .	26
Cost . . . . .	27
Other Attrition . . . . .	28
Trends . . . . .	29
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . .	31
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	33

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A STUDY OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PRE-INITIAL ENTRY  
TRAINING PROGRAM OF THE PENNSYLVANIA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In 1985 The Adjutant General for Pennsylvania (TAGPA), Pennsylvania National Guard, directed that a model program be developed to train non-prior service recruits prior to their departure for Basic Training (BCT). The TAGPA's initiative was in response to the staggering number of Pennsylvania Army National Guard (PAARNG) recruits who had failed to successfully complete BCT and/or Advanced Individual Training (AIT). By mid-1985 the failure rate approached 30%.<sup>1</sup> This initiative became known as the Pre-Initial Entry Training (Pre-IET) Program.<sup>2</sup> The ultimate goal of this program was to significantly reduce the number of BCT and AIT failures by better preparing new recruits for future training requirements to which they would be exposed at BCT and AIT. Almost immediately following the initiation of the program and graduation of the first class from the Pre-IET Program in November 1985, BCT and AIT attrition rates were significantly reduced to approximately 6%.<sup>3</sup> By the end of July 1987 the recruit attrition rate for Pennsylvania was reduced to 3.6%, well below that experienced by the entire Army National Guard, the U.S. Army Reserve, and the Regular Army.<sup>4</sup> The purpose of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of the Pennsylvania Pre-IET Program.



## BACKGROUND

During the Vietnam War era many Army National Guard units throughout the United States enjoyed great success in the area of strength management. For many recruits, membership in the Army National Guard represented a viable alternative to the draft. With the end of this war in the early 1970's, many Army National Guard units began to experience severe decreases in strength as the Army began to transition to the "All Volunteer Army."<sup>5</sup> In some cases, these losses were somewhat offset by the influx of veterans of Vietnam, other prior service personnel, and non-prior service recruits. Entering the 1980's, the Army National Guard assumed an increased role in national defense with an accompanying increase in end-strength authorization necessary to satisfy this role.<sup>6</sup> Recently, efforts to attain the desired end-strength in the Army National Guard have been hampered by significant losses caused by excessive attrition. One critical and glaring problem has been the significant loss of personnel who have enlisted but have failed to successfully complete BCT and/or AIT.<sup>7</sup> In some states the non-prior service recruit attrition rate has exceeded 30% while the loss to the Total Army exceeds five billion dollars.<sup>8</sup>

## LIMITATIONS

This study is limited to an evaluation of the Pennsylvania Pre-IET Program. Although there have been several training initiatives in both the National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve

(USAR) that raise the consciousness of new recruits as to their impending training requirements at BCT and AIT, the Pennsylvania Pre-IET Program is unique as far as the total expenditure of time and effort spent in screening, counseling, and training new recruits. Effectiveness of this program will be measured primarily in terms of the number of recruits who have successfully completed the Pre-IET Program and have also completed BCT and/or AIT, compared to the BCT/AIT attrition rates attributed to all other Army National Guard, USAR, and Regular Army recruits who have not undergone this Pre-IET Program. This study is limited to results obtained between November 1985 and July 1987. For purposes of this study, no distinction is made between male and female recruits.

#### ENDNOTES

1. Joseph Zambone, "Pre-REP Training," National Guard, March 1987, p. 16.

2. The Adjutant General of Pennsylvania, Training Circular 351-8, pp. 1-3 (hereafter referred to as "TAGPA Circular 351-8") January 1986.

3. The Adjutant General of Pennsylvania, Training Circular 351-8, p. 1 (hereafter referred to as "TAGPA Circular 351-8") November 1987.

4. U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command, Annual Trainee Report, 1985-1987.

5. U.S. Department of Defense, Official Guard and Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics, FY 1976-1979.

6. "Total Force," Defense, September/October 1987, pp. 17-30.

7. U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command, Annual Trainee Report, 1987.

8. Zambone, pp. 16-20.

## CHAPTER II

### REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

#### PERFORMANCE

Much has been written concerning performance and performance levels of human beings. Writers from various fields, including behavioral psychology, business, education, and the military, have advanced theories and have conducted studies which have identified critical elements of performance. A brief review of several of the more pertinent of these works will help identify criteria for successful performance by individuals in the military. It is further hoped that these criteria will help explain the success of the Pennsylvania Pre-IET Program.

One of the most traditional and well-referenced behavioral psychologists is Abraham Maslow. Maslow postulates that all human performance is based upon the satisfaction of five (5) basic needs arranged in the following ascending order of priority.<sup>1</sup> The lowest, but most important need is physiological--the need for food, water, shelter, and rest. An important note is that performance drops significantly if one or more of these needs is deprived. The next priority need is the need for security. The next priority need is social--humans exhibit the need for belonging, attention, and acceptance by peer groups. The following need is for self-esteem, which includes: self-confidence, self-respect, sense of achievement, and

knowledge. Finally, Maslow suggests the ultimate human need is self-actualization, or the realization of one's own potential. This is primarily concerned with one's desire for self-development.

Based on several studies of human performance, Connellan found that adults perform tasks at greater levels of proficiency when the individual knows what is expected of him/her; when the individual is capable of the desired behavior; if the consequences are positive for performing the task correctly; when there is timely, accurate, and positive feedback.<sup>2</sup> Connellan also found that a pre-training program for factory workers deficient in appropriate skills for their occupation was more successful in raising individual skill levels and ultimately total job performance than was on-the-job training.<sup>3</sup>

Studies by Fitts and Posner indicate that maximum performance in a variety of tasks improves with prior practice when the subject is properly motivated.<sup>4</sup> Conversely, they found that practice without motivation often results in poorer performance. Their studies also indicate maximum levels of performance occur when knowledge of results (feedback) is provided.<sup>5</sup>

Cofer and Appley found that successful individual performance in a variety of tasks leads to an increase in the standards of excellence, while failure leads to a decrease.<sup>6</sup>

Gagne', in his work with military personnel for training purposes, concluded the following psychological principles. First, any human task may be analyzed into a set of component tasks. Second, components of tasks are mediators of the final

task performance--that is, their presence insures positive transfer to a final performance. Thirdly, the basic principles of training design consist of: identifying the component tasks of a final performance; insuring that each of these component tasks is fully achieved; arranging the total learning situation in a sequence which will insure optimal mediational effects from one component to another.<sup>7</sup>

Additionally, most young men and women who are entering the various components of the military service come with a set of perceptions, concerns, and expectations. The Department of the Army conducted a study of the perceptions, concerns, and expectations of soldiers prior to their BCT.<sup>8</sup> It was found that a majority of these soldiers expected training to be good, however, most expected the subjects, including physical requirements, to be too difficult and they would not have enough time or opportunity to practice. Further, a majority expected the first three weeks of training to be the most difficult. Finally, most expected the transition from civilian to military life to be very difficult, even for a short duration--two to four months.

#### NON-PRIOR SERVICE TRAINING

In order to formally address the specific problem of the high attrition rate by Army National Guard personnel at BCT and AIT, the National Guard Bureau directed the establishment of the Non-Prior Service Personnel Training Program (NPSPTP)

in 1983.<sup>9</sup> The NPSPTP was designed for non-prior service Army National Guard recruits who had not yet attended BCT and/or AIT. The purpose of this program was to "introduce Army National Guard personnel to the military environment and to ease their adjustment to active duty."<sup>10</sup>

A thirty-six (36) hour program of instruction (POI) was developed and was to be administered by Army National Guard units over a period of three (3) drill weekends.<sup>11</sup> Subjects were related, but not limited, to those subjects taught during BCT. For example, the following subjects were covered under Troop Information (10 hours): the role and purpose of the National Guard as a State military force; military justice--State and Federal; military courtesy; information concerning promotion and benefits.<sup>12</sup> The remainder of instruction was delegated to the teaching of general military subjects (26 hours) which included: drill and ceremonies, first aid, field hygiene and sanitation, interior guard duty, recruiting and retention, physical security, maintenance, physical fitness training, and mechanical training on the M-16 rifle and 45 cal pistol.

National Guard Regulation 350-1, dated 30 November 1983, elaborated further.

The program should be conducted on a consolidated basis where practical. The 36-hour training program (Appendix 1) is a guide which suggested references designed to be presented on 3 weekends, scheduling 12 hours of instruction on each MUTA-4. Flexibility and imagination are encouraged in adopting the training program to local training conditions. Maximum use should be made of integrated and concurrent training to include visitation to the unit/State military

museum for the purpose of indoctrinating NPS personnel on the history and traditions of the Guard.<sup>13</sup>

### Observations

Although there was a demonstrated need for the components of this program, no significant drop in the BCT and/or AIT attrition rate was observed during the remainder of 1983, 1984, and 1985.<sup>14</sup> As the attrition rate ballooned to 30% in some states, the program came under some scrutiny and became a topic for consideration and discussion at the annual Army National Guard Commander's Conference, 1985.<sup>15</sup>

There was some feeling that, although the contents of the program were appropriate and even necessary, the administration of the program at unit level (company and battalion) presented an additional work load for personnel and organizations already saturated with other requirements. In Pennsylvania, alone, several command inspections and unit visitations during this period indicated that few units had established any viable program, or, for those units that did, instruction was often sporadic or of poor quality.<sup>16</sup> More importantly, the Pennsylvania Army National Guard continued to suffer dramatic losses in attrition of new recruits at BCT and AIT. By mid-1985 TAGPA directed the establishment of the Pennsylvania Pre-Initial Entry Training Program.<sup>17</sup>

### ENDNOTES

1. Abraham H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality, pp. 35-46.

2. Thomas K. Connellan, How to Improve Human Performance, p. 53.
3. Ibid., pp. 76,77.
4. Paul M. Fitts and Michael I. Posner, Human Performance, pp. 18,19.
5. Ibid., p. 19.
6. C.N. Cofer and M.H. Appley, Motivation: Theory and Research, pp. 35-50.
7. Robert M. Gagne', "Military Training and Principles of Learning," American Psychologist, Number 17, 1962, pp. 83-91.
8. Eugene H. Drucker, "The Effects of Basic Combat Training on the Attitudes of the Soldier," Human Resources Research Organization Report, pp. 1-5.
9. National Guard Bureau, National Guard Regulation 350-1, pp. 4-2 to 4-4 (hereafter referred to as "NGR 350-1").
10. Ibid., p. 4-3.
11. Ibid., pp 4-3 to 4-4.
12. Ibid., pp. 4-3 to 4-4.
13. Ibid., p. 4-3.
14. U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command, Annual Trainee Report, 1985-1987.
15. Army National Guard, Commander's Conference, 1985.
16. Pennsylvania Army National Guard, Command Inspection Report, 1985.
17. The Adjutant General of Pennsylvania, TAGPA Circular 351-8, p. 1.



## CHAPTER III

### THE PENNSYLVANIA PRE-INITIAL ENTRY TRAINING PROGRAM

The Pennsylvania Pre-Initial Entry Training Program (PA PIETP) was formally initiated in November 1985 by The TAGPA.<sup>1</sup> This new training program was based on the assumption that, although the National Guard Bureau NPSTP of 1983 contained several merits--mainly the subject material, it was severely limited by the lack of quality and cohesion of instruction. In addition, TAGPA believed that this program (1983) did not go far enough in addressing various needs facing new recruits attending BCT and AIT. Various documented reports indicated that recruits from Pennsylvania were experiencing high attrition rates caused by attitude, inadequate physical conditioning, pre-existing and disqualifying legal and physical problems.<sup>2</sup> Based on the additional assumption that the Non-Prior Service Training Program merely represented a guide, a more comprehensive program was needed for Pennsylvania. Formal guidance was developed and published in TAGPA Training Circular 351-8.<sup>3</sup> The first class of new recruits graduated from the PA PIETP in November 1985 and went on to BCT.

#### Purpose and Objectives

The purpose of the PA PIETP was more comprehensive than that of the previous NPSTP. While the purpose of the NPSTP

was primarily to introduce non-prior service enlisted recruits to the "military environment" the purpose of the PA PIETP was to "prepare soldiers to successfully complete initial entry training" (BCT/AIT).<sup>4</sup>

The objectives of the PA PIETP included:

To screen recruits to determine mental and physical qualifications.

To provide training which will prepare recruits for IET (BCT/AIT) by assisting them first hand to become more familiar with the training requirements of basic training.

To insure the maximum number of PAARNG recruits successfully complete IET and return to units as trained soldiers.

To insure recruits know that the entire chain of command cares and wants them to successfully complete IET training both for themselves and for the PAARNG.

To provide an opportunity for PAARNG recruits to "buddy up" with other members of the PAARNG going to the same training station and provide for their departure together.<sup>5</sup>

In 1987, the objectives were expanded to include:

To insure soldiers have been enlisted in accordance with regulation and are qualified to be trained in their respective MOS.

To insure Phase II (AIT for personnel such as high school students who take Phase I - BCT, during one summer session and return the following year to complete Phase II - AIT) trainees receive refresher training, thereby arriving with the same level of training as their peers at the training base.<sup>6</sup>

### Process

The PA PIETP is a four-day course which begins on a Wednesday and ends on a Saturday. Since its inception, the program has been averaging about forty-four (44) weeks out of

every year and is administered by and conducted at the State Military Academy. Each weekly cycle of the program is initiated by the Recruiting Coordinator at the Pennsylvania Department of Military Affairs, Headquarters, Pennsylvania National Guard following confirmation of the number of new NPS recruits who have qualified in both mental and physical categories for a specific MOS and have also been given a specific start date for BCT. All mental and physical testing as well as MOS qualifications and determination of BCT start dates occur at one of four Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS) geographically located within Pennsylvania.<sup>7</sup> Once a recruit is found to be fully qualified, he/she is given an Oath of Enlistment and is a member of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard. Normally, there will be a delay of between one to three months from the time the individual has been found qualified at MEPS and the reporting date at BCT. During this time the new recruit will attend drill(s) with his/her assigned unit, will normally be issued uniforms, and will be given a unit orientation.<sup>8</sup>

The Recruiting Coordinator is responsible for forming each new class at the PA PIETP and for notification of the reporting date, location, time, appropriate equipment, and other related administrative information.<sup>9</sup> At the same time the recruit's unit will also be informed. Each cycle of the PA PIETP is initiated on the Wednesday immediately prior to the Monday reporting date to BCT/AIT (all training reporting

dates for the Total Army including Army National Guard, USAR, and Regular Army are on Mondays). The number of recruits in each PA PIETP class as well as the specific starting Wednesday are really pre-determined based on the training base allocations received during the original MEPS qualification process. The average class size over the twenty-one month period from November 1985 to July 1987 averaged more than thirty-two. While undergoing these four days of training, each recruit is paid according to a Split Unit Training Assembly (SUTA) arrangement whereby this training will be in lieu of their regularly scheduled drills for two months.

On a Wednesday that a new class begins, each recruit is escorted to the Pennsylvania Military Academy at Fort Indiantown Gap by a member of his/her unit--usually a full-time unit NCO or officer. That unit person is required to remain until the recruit's initial processing has been successfully completed. This initial process includes a thorough screening of the recruit's personnel records, health records, orders to active duty, clothing and equipment records.<sup>10</sup> In addition, each recruit is medically screened for possible injuries that would prohibit entrance to active duty as well as adherence to height and weight standards. Subsequently, each recruit is screened for legal problems which would also prohibit entrance to active duty. This portion of the program is critical. The areas just mentioned account for approximately 80% of the BCT/AIT recruit attrition rate for the Total Army.<sup>11</sup> If a

deficiency exists in any of the above areas that cannot be corrected, the recruit will not be allowed to continue and will return home with his/her unit representative. This action most often results in only a temporary disqualification but requires a new BCT date and PA PIETP date which the Recruiting Coordinator arranges through MEPS. In a few cases, permanent disqualification results from this screening process and the individual is discharged.<sup>12</sup>

### Staffing

The commandant of the Pennsylvania National Guard Military Academy (PNGMA) is responsible for providing the staff support and the necessary training assets and facilities required.<sup>13</sup> The minimum full-time staff for this program includes: three (3) administrative personnel, two (2) medical personnel, two (2) supply personnel, and three (3) school-trained MOS drill sergeants. Under the current organization, one of the medical personnel also acts as the NCOIC. One of the administrative personnel is the Recruiting Coordinator (REP). All of the above personnel are Pennsylvania Army National Guardsmen on Full -Time Training Duty ( FTTD ) orders. In the past, these personnel have been able to be extended beyond the required maximum of 180 days. However, due to a recent interpretation concerning utilization of FTTD funds for other than attendance at military schools, new ways of staffing and/or funding may be necessary in the near future. Currently, all 3 drill sergeants are MOS qualified, two of whom served in this capacity on

active duty. In addition, due to a traditionally large influx of recruits during the months of June, July, and August, full-time National Guard unit training NCO's have been required to supplement and assist the current drill sergeants with their training duties. Although this is a required additional duty for training NCO's, in the past only a few pre-screened and pre-trained training NCO's have actually assisted in the PA PIETP since November 1985.

#### Program of Instruction

The Program of Instruction (POI) for the PA PIETP includes thirty-five (35) hours of instruction. The first day, Wednesday, is broken down to the following allocations. Up to four (4) hours is allocated for travel to the State Military Academy and four (4) hours are allocated for in-processing, which includes records and medical screening, course orientation, personal hygiene, and introduction to the history and traditions of the National Guard, the Pennsylvania Army National Guard, and that associated with the particular unit to which the recruit is a member. When available, the State Sergeant Major conducts the history and traditions instruction. During a visit to the program, the author observed the State Sergeant Major giving an especially effective block of instruction. He related the history and traditions of the National Guard to all of the units represented by recruits that day.<sup>14</sup> In addition, he talked about their value to their family, unit, and to the defense of our nation. He spoke about what they could expect

at BCT, the kinds of training they were about to receive during these four (4) days, that they would be better prepared for BCT, and that they would be receiving feedback as to their progress during the program. He concluded with a discussion of human needs of self-respect, belonging to an organization, peer acceptance, and asked them to consider their future potential. At the completion of this instruction, personnel identified as going to the same training center for BCT/AIT were encouraged to get to know each other during these four (4) days of training so they would be able to act as an informal support group while on active duty.

The final portion of the POI for the initial day is a counseling session referred to by the staff as "true confessions," at which the recruit is encouraged to discuss privately with a drill sergeant any legal, moral, or physical problem which had not previously been a matter of official record which might disqualify him/her from service in the military. This particular session has proven instrumental in significantly reducing the number of Pennsylvania Army National Guardsmen who might otherwise be discharged from the National Guard while at BCT/AIT, wasting large sums of training money, training spaces, and causing an unnecessary delay in military readiness. As a result of this counseling session, there have been cases of temporary as well as permanent disqualification, the latter resulting in discharge.<sup>15</sup>

The remainder of the POI is spread over three (3) days-- Thursday, Friday, and Saturday. It includes thirty-one (31) hours divided for general subjects, physical conditioning, introduction to M-16A1 training, and orientation to BCT.

The "mission" which guides each subject and unit of instruction over the entire four-day period is to "increase each individual's self-motivation, to create a positive attitude, and to provide positive feedback to each soldier."<sup>16</sup>

The POI of split option personnel (those who complete BCT and return the following year to complete AIT - high school students) differs in several ways from that of a recruit who will attend the PA PIETP and go on to BCT and AIT in a one-station unit training program (OSUT). The split option soldier attends the four-day program prior to BCT and returns the following year to complete another four-day program prior to returning to AIT. Although the first day, Wednesday, is essentially the same for both categories of recruits, for the next three (3) days, emphasis is placed on physical fitness and a review of BCT skills and proficiencies.<sup>17</sup> The course culminates in a successful Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) and a BCT end of cycle validation test. The ultimate aim is to reacquaint the soldier with those skills and proficiencies that he/she demonstrated 10-12 months previously, which they will need to be successful in order to be at the same level as their peers.



Both new recruits and split option personnel complete the PA PIETP on a Saturday evening. They are released on Sunday to report to a hotel/motel in close proximity to their original MEPS. Both categories of recruits are required to report to their MEPS on Monday morning for final verification processing, which includes records screening and screening for any restricting health problem, including conformance to appropriate height and weight standards. Upon completion of the screening process, recruits depart for their appropriate BCT or AIT training base.

#### ENDNOTES

1. The Adjutant General of Pennsylvania, TAGPA Circular 351-8, p. 1.
2. William D. Clark, Department of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), letter to the Secretary of the Army, 22 August 1986.
3. TAGPA Circular 351-8, pp. 1-4.
4. Ibid., p. 1.
5. Ibid., p. 1.
6. Ibid., pp. 1-4.
7. National Guard Bureau, National Guard Regulation 600-200, pp. 2-19 to 2-25.
8. Pennsylvania National Guard Military Academy, Recruit Training, pp. 1-5.
9. TAGPA Circular 351-8, p. 1.
10. Ibid., pp. 1-4.
11. U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command, Annual Trainee Report, 1985-1987.
12. NGR 600-200, pp. 2-33 to 2-34.

13. TAGPA Circular 351-8, p. 1.
14. Visit, Observation, and Interview with LTC Marshall Eward, Deputy Commandant, Pennsylvania Military Academy, 18 November 1987.
15. Pennsylvania National Guard, Pre-IET Class Reports, 1985-1987.
16. Pennsylvania National Guard Military Academy, Recruit Training, Annex K, pp. 1,2.
17. TAGPA Circular 351-8, p. 5.

CHAPTER IV  
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

The Pennsylvania Pre-Initial Entry Training Program (PA PIETP) was established in 1985, and the first class of 22 non-prior service recruits graduated from the Pennsylvania Military Academy in November 1985. From the initial start date until 31 July 1987 (cutoff date for purposes of this study), the PA PIETP has trained and forwarded 3,261 recruits to BCT and AIT. Of that number of recruits who reported to BCT and AIT, over 96% successfully completed their training.<sup>1</sup> The following are the findings and analyses related to the results of this exceptionally successful program.

For purposes of this analysis, results covering the entire twenty-one (21) month period from the start of the program in November 1985 until the cutoff on 31 July 1987 will be combined and treated as one period of time and one piece of data.

ATTRITION

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) utilizes three (3) categories in order to classify trainee attrition at BCT and AIT.<sup>2</sup> The first of these categories is Entry Level Separation (ELS) which includes lack of motivation, failure to adjust, and poor attitude. The second category is

labeled Existed Prior to Service (EPTS) which deals primarily with medical and sometimes legal problems which existed, but were not made known, prior to enlistment. The final category is Other which includes all other circumstances not covered by ELS or EPTS criteria. The following analysis compares the results of the PA PIETP to those of the Army National Guard, USAR, and Regular Army.

Figure 1 indicates that during the period of time between November 1985 and July 1987, the Pennsylvania Army National Guard experienced a significantly lower BCT/AIT attrition rate than the USAR, Regular Army, and the rest of the Army National Guard. During this period, PAARNG lost 119 out of a possible 3,261 recruits for a 3.6% attrition rate.<sup>3</sup> This rate is compared to rest of the Army National Guard which lost 4,547 out of a possible 82,554 recruits for a 5.5% attrition rate. Also, a comparison can be made with the USAR which lost 2,875 out of a possible 59,616 recruits for a 4.9% attrition rate. Finally, a comparison can be made with the Regular Army which lost 10,409 out of a possible 196,328 recruits for a 5.3% attrition rate.<sup>4</sup>

Figure 2 indicates that during the same period of time, PAARNG experienced a significantly lower BCT/AIT attrition rate caused by problems which existed prior to entering military service (EPTS). During this period, PAARNG lost 1.7% of its recruits, the rest of the Army National Guard lost 2.7%, USAR lost 2.4%, and the Regular Army had a loss rate of 3.0%.<sup>5</sup>

BOI /AIT ATTRITION RATES  
NOVEMBER 1985 - JULY 1987




FIGURE 1

PAARNG	Pennsylvania Army National Guard
ARNG	Army National Guard
USAR	United States Army Reserve
RA	Regular Army

EPTS ATTRITION RATES  
NOVEMBER 1985 - JULY 1987




FIGURE 2

PAARNG	Pennsylvania Army National Guard
ARNG	Army National Guard
USAR	United States Army Reserve
RA	Regular Army

Figure 3 indicates that during the same period of time, PAARNG experienced a lower BCT/AIT attrition rate caused by problems which occurred at BCT or AIT categorized as Entry Level Service (ELS). During this period, PAARNG had a loss rate of 1.0% compared to the rest of the Army National Guard which had a rate of 1.5%, the USAR with a rate of 1.3%, and the Regular Army with a loss rate of 1.6%.<sup>6</sup>

Figure 4 indicates that during the same period of time, PAARNG experienced a significantly lower BCT/AIT attrition rate caused by a variety of reasons categorized as "Other" (TRADOC).<sup>7</sup> During this period, PAARNG had a loss rate of .3%, the rest of the Army National Guard had a rate of 1.1%, USAR experienced a loss rate of .7%, and the Regular Army had an attrition rate of .8%.<sup>8</sup>

There is a significant cost in dollars associated with training soldiers. Considering a wide variety of MOS training and their related costs, it has been estimated that the average cost of providing BCT/AIT training per individual soldier amounts to, at minimum, \$20,000.<sup>9</sup> This figure does not include additional costs associated with recruiting. If a recruit is attrited prior to the successful completion of his/her BCT/AIT, the entire cost is lost. For purposes of comparison, had the entire Army National Guard been able to reduce its attrition rate from 5.5% to 4.5% (still .9% above the PAARNG rate), the savings would have amounted to approximately one million dollars. Had the Total Army been able to reduce its losses by

ENTRY LEVEL SERVICE ATTRITION  
NOVEMBER 1985 - JULY 1987




FIGURE 3

PAARNG	Pennsylvania Army National Guard
ARNG	Army National Guard
USAR	United States Army Reserve
RA	Regular Army



OTHER ATTRITION RATES  
NOVEMBER 1985 - JULY 1987




FIGURE 4

PAARNG	Pennsylvania Army National Guard
ARNG	Army National Guard
USAR	United States Army Reserve
RA	Regular Army

1%, the dollar savings would have amounted to approximately 3.6 million dollars.

Figure 5 shows the amount of training dollars lost during this period due to the corresponding BCT/AIT attrition rates. During this period, PAARNG lost approximately 2.4 million dollars, the rest of the Army National Guard lost approximately 91 million dollars, the USAR lost approximately 58 million dollars, the Regular Army lost approximately 208 million dollars, while the entire lost to whole Army exceeded 359 million dollars.

Another way of determining dollar savings is to compare the annual cost of the PA PIETP with what was saved by a 3.6% attrition rate. The cost of the PA PIETP for the same 21-month period has been estimated at \$357,000.<sup>10</sup> The savings realized at 3.6% compared to 5.5% (the Army National Guard attrition rate) would have amounted to a minimum of 1.2 million dollars, or a savings in cost of approximately 65%.

Although the PA PIETP represents a significant savings of dollars over a relatively short period of time, the real savings are seen as improved manpower readiness. During this 21-month period of time, the Total Army could have had more trained personnel--sooner. Based upon a 3.6% attrition rate, by the end of July 1987, the Army could have had 5,646 additional personnel than it did. Of this figure, the Army National Guard could have had 1,576 more personnel.

CCSTS RELATED TO ATTRITION  
NOVEMBER 1985 - JULY 1987




FIGURE 5

PAARNG	Pennsylvania Army National Guard
ARNG	Army National Guard
USAR	United States Army Reserve
RA	Regular Army

## Trends

As was indicated previously, although the intent has been to send all non-prior service recruits through the PA PIETP, it is not always possible. Approximately 2-3% of those eligible to attend the PA PIETP have not, due to a variety of scheduling conflicts, including high school, college, and work. Although specific data had not been collected on these individuals, it is now being collected and with interesting results. For the first four (4) months in FY 88, TRADOC has reported a total of 6 BCT/AIT attrition losses for PAARNG.<sup>11</sup> Due to improved data collecting and monitoring procedures instituted by the Recruiting (REP) Coordinator at TAGPA, it has been further determined that half of these losses were incurred by personnel who did not attend the PA PIETP. This category of personnel will not be monitored closely for future trends and possible improvements in scheduling procedures.

## ENDNOTES

1. Pennsylvania Army National Guard, Pre-IET Class Report, 15 January 1988.
2. U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command, Annual Trainee Report, 1985-1987.
3. Pennsylvania Army National Guard, pp. 1,2.
4. U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command, Attrition Reports, 1985-1987.
5. Ibid., EPTS Attrition, 1985-1987.
6. Ibid., ELS Attrition, 1985-1987.
7. Ibid., Other Attrition, 1985-1987.

8. Ibid., Other Attrition, 1985-1987.
9. U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command, Annual Trainee Report, 1986-1987.
10. Ibid., 1986-1987.
11. Pennsylvania Army National Guard, pp. 1,2.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

After an analysis of the available data, it is possible to conclude the following. The Pennsylvania Pre-Initial Entry Training Program is an effective course of instruction based on proven fundamentals of human performance which ultimately lead to the successful accomplishment of BCT and AIT tasks to Army standards. It has been shown that recruits who have successfully completed the PA PIETP have a greater chance to successfully complete BCT and AIT than recruits who have not attended or completed this training. The total cost for staffing and managing the program is extremely cost effective, especially considering the return on the dollars spent. Further, type and amount of savings incurred when a greater number of recruits successfully complete BCT and AIT include significant savings of training dollars, increased efficiency of limited and costly training facilities and resources, savings of restricted BCT and AIT allocations, and greater efficiency in the utilization of available manpower in a time of an ever-decreasing manpower pool. Most importantly, the total Army readiness posture is achieved faster, more economically, more efficiently, and with a great deal less turbulence. With regular funding and appropriate staffing the PA PIETP should

be established locally or regionally to benefit more members of the Total Army force.

Considering the findings of the study as well as the implications for improvement in the ways we prepare new recruits to enter the Army, the following recommendations are made.

1. The National Guard Bureau should adopt the PA PIETP as a model program and encourage other states to initiate similar programs--especially for those states where the TOE structure is large enough to justify the effort.

2. Regional programs should be established for those states where the TOE structure is insufficient to justify the effort in terms of cost and numbers of new recruits to be trained.

3. Total Army Pre-IET Programs should be established. Further, State Military Academies are available and are ideally suited for this training.

4. TRADOC should establish standardization of the statistical data concerning BCT and AIT training including demographic data by state, region, and command.

5. The Pre-IET Program should be fully funded.

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4. Drucker, Eugene H. "The Effects of Basic Combat Training on the Attitudes of the Soldier." Human Resources Research Organization Report. June 1974, pp. 1-5.
5. Eward, Marshall, LTC. Deputy Commandant Pennsylvania Military Academy. Personal Interview and Observation of Pre-IET Program. Pennsylvania: 18 November 1987.
6. Gagne', Robert M. "Military Training and Principles of Learning." American Psychologist, Vol 17, 1962, pp. 83-91.
7. National Guard Bureau. National Guard Regulation 350-1: Training. Washington: 30 November 1983.
8. National Guard Bureau. National Guard Regulation 600-200: Personnel. Washington: 20 March 1987.
9. Pennsylvania National Guard Military Academy. Recruit Training. Pennsylvania: Military Academy Publication, 1985.
10. Pennsylvania National Guard. Pre-IET Program Class Reports. Pennsylvania: 1985-1987.
11. The Adjutant General of Pennsylvania. Training Circular 351-8: The Pre-Initial Entry Training Program. Pennsylvania: 25 August 1987.
12. U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command. Annual Trainee Accountability Report. 1985-1987.
13. Zambone, Joseph. "Pre-Rep Training." National Guard, Vol. XLI, Number 3, March 1987, pp. 16-20.